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Note 02·Methodology · Behaviour·2026-06·v0.3 · draft·11 min

Built to say no.

Compliance bias is the #1 documented failure mode of synthetic research. Here is how we engineer against it: friction coefficients, asymmetric negativity, complex-contagion gates, and loud-vs-silent churn.

by Holon Research

ABSTRACT

We document four mechanisms in Holon's behaviour layer designed to suppress the sycophancy bias documented by NN/g [1] and the synthetic-research literature: (i) role-and-event friction coefficients f ≥ 1 applied at the causal hazard level, (ii) asymmetric negativity weighting (ν ≈ 2.5η) [3] that bypasses friction, (iii) Centola-style complex-contagion gates [5] for deliberative roles requiring k ≥ 2 distinct adopter contacts, and (iv) a role-specific loud-exit probability β capturing the TARP finding that ~10% of dissatisfied customers complain publicly [6]. We give parameters, code, and the comparison data we use to validate each mechanism.

1. Why panels say yes

Ask an LLM persona whether it likes your idea and, more often than not, it is kind to you. The Nielsen Norman Group is blunt: synthetic users tend to please the moderator rather than mirror real skepticism, which makes them unreliable precisely for the high-stakes decisions teams most want to de-risk [1]. The 2026 synthetic-research meta-review reaches the same conclusion: directional confidence on simple questions, systematic over-acceptance on hard ones [9 · Note 01].

If your simulator always says yes, it is theatre. Holon encodes resistance at four levels of the hazard model.

Negativity weight
2.5×
bad signal vs good · Baumeister [3]
Distinct adopters
≥ 2
required for risky transitions · Centola [5]
Exit split (%)
10 / 20 / 70
loud · silent drift · never complain · TARP [6]

2. Friction as a parameter

Every role carries a friction coefficient f ≥ 1 per event type. It divides the social pressure that reaches the adoption hazard, so resistance acts at the causal level rather than as a cosmetic multiplier on the final probability:

effective pressure
φᵢᵉᶠᶠ(t) = φᵢ(t) / fᵢ⁽ᵉ⁾ fᵢ⁽ᵉ⁾ = f_role · f_policy · f_memory

Factorising f by role, policy and memory keeps the system explainable: every refusal traces back to which factor dominated. A sample of the deployed table:

RoleEventf (calibrated)Source / reasoning
Skeptical CFOprice increase4procurement gate, budget memory
Burned-out PMnew feature2.4tool-fatigue policy [Note 01 §5]
Penny-Pincherprice3.5extreme price-sensitivity prior
Early Adopterfeature1no friction at the innovation edge
Influencernarrative1.5moderate; public exposure cost
Friction · by role× pressure required
  • Skeptical CFOprice increase
    4.0×
  • Penny-Pincherany price move
    3.5×
  • Burned-out PMnew feature
    2.4×
  • Influencernarrative shift
    1.5×
  • Early Adopterfeature release
    1.0×

3. Fear is not dampened

Friction applies only to positive pressure. Negative signal is weighted ν ≈ 2.5η and bypasses the dampener entirely. The constant is not arbitrary:

  • Baumeister et al. (2001) [3] — meta-analysis: "bad is stronger than good" at ratios 2.0–4.0 across affect, learning, social interaction, persuasion.
  • Anderson (1998) [4] — negative WOM 2–4× the impact of equivalent positive WOM in customer satisfaction studies.
  • Goldenberg, Libai & Muller — empirical NWOM impact on consumer brand evaluation consistent with ν ≈ 2.5×.
negativity weight — show
u⁻(t) = ν ⊙ d(t) ν ≈ 2.5 · η (never divided by f)
Schema
Positive pressure passes through friction f ≥ 1 (one role can refuse social proof up to 4×). Negative pressure carries weight ν ≈ 2.5η and bypasses friction entirely.

Resisting enthusiasm is human; resisting fear is not. That asymmetry is what produces the bad-news cascades that real markets exhibit — and that politely averaged synthetic panels typically miss.

4. Risky decisions need many voices

Simple contagion (one enthusiastic neighbour is enough) overstates B2B adoption. Centola's complex-contagion experiments [5] show costly or risky behaviours require reinforcement from multiple distinct sources. Deliberative roles — CFO, Cautious Buyer, Department Head — only count social proof once they have ≥ 2 distinct adopter contacts in their neighbourhood; otherwise their positive pressure is attenuated:

gate — show
if | distinct_adopters(i) | < kᵢ → φ⁺ᵢ ← 0.15 · φ⁺ᵢ
Show implementation — python
# distinct-source gate (vectorised approximation)
n_distinct = (W_in > 0).multiply(I).getnnz(axis=1)   # per-receiver count
under_gate = n_distinct < k_role                     # boolean mask
phi_pos[under_gate] *= 0.15                          # attenuate

The measurable effect: adoption S-curves rise more slowly and clusters can block cascades — closer to how enterprise software actually spreads (Aral & Walker [8 · Note 01]).

5. Loud exits and silent ones

Not everyone who leaves tells you. TARP's customer-complaint studies [6] find that only ~10% of dissatisfied customers complain publicly, while ~70% never complain at all. Holon gives each role a loud-exit probability β:

Roleβ (loud-exit)Effect
Power User0.6thread, write-up, warning to network
Influencer0.55public NWOM amplification
Champion0.45narrative reversal — "I evangelised this"
Cautious Buyer0.3private warnings, quiet review
Lurker0.08silent — never tells the dashboard

Your dashboard sees the loud exits. The marketplace feels both. Holon surfaces both in the verdict.

Schema
TARP customer-complaint data [6]: only ~10% of dissatisfied customers ever complain publicly. Your dashboard reports the tip; Holon models the rest.

Your dashboard reports 11% churn. The city shows another 20% of silent disengagement the dashboard can't see.

the insight the D/R split is engineered to surface

6. Intervals, never oracles

Because friction, negativity and gating are stochastic, a single run is meaningless. We sweep 500 seeds and report a p10–p90 fan per metric. Calibrated cities (Scale tier) fit (p, q, μ) to a client's historical adoption and churn curves and report a per-account MAPE on a held-out window — never a global accuracy claim.

Built on research published in

Nature
APA — Review of General Psychology
SAGE
Univ. of Chicago Press

Methodology builds on peer-reviewed research from the venues above. See references for exact papers.

References

  1. [1]
  2. [2]
    Holon Field Note 01 — Not another panel. A market simulator.the underlying Bass-SIR-D engine
  3. [3]
    Baumeister, R. et al. (2001). Bad Is Stronger Than Good. Review of General Psychology 5(4).negativity asymmetry meta-analysis
  4. [4]
    Anderson, E. (1998). Customer Satisfaction and Word of Mouth. Journal of Service Research 1(1).negative WOM 2–4× impact
  5. [5]
    Centola, D. & Macy, M. (2007). Complex Contagions and the Weakness of Long Ties. AJS 113(3).risky adoption needs distinct sources
  6. [6]
    TARP / Goodman, J. (1979–). Consumer Complaint Behavior studies.~10% public complaints among dissatisfied customers
  7. [7]
    Goldenberg, J., Libai, B. & Muller, E. Talk of the Network.NWOM dynamics in product diffusion
  8. [8]
    Aral, S. & Walker, D. (2012). Identifying Influential and Susceptible Members of Social Networks. Science 337(6092).asymmetric η across roles
  9. [9]
    Bond et al. (2012). A 61-million-person experiment in social influence and political mobilization. Nature 489.real-world threshold/gate effects in networked behaviour

Reproducibility

Every figure in this note is reproducible from seed = 4711 on the engine in /engine. Run hashes ship with each release; deviations from the published hash are reportable bugs. The TypeScript and Python reference implementations are tested for hash parity at CI.

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NEXT · Note 01
Not another panel. A market simulator.